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FOREWORD
The fifteenth issue of the University of Notre Dame Australia Law 
Review (‘UNDALR’) contains an interesting selection of articles.  
In the first article on the constitutionality of same-sex marriage, 
James McLean examines the constitutional issues associated with a 
legislative extension of marriage nomenclature to homosexual unions. 
Through an application of the established principles of constitutional 
interpretation, the article explains why same-sex marriage lies beyond 
the competence of the Commonwealth Parliament, and argues that s 
109 of the Constitution would render inoperative for inconsistency 
with the Commonwealth Marriage Act any same-sex marriage law 
enacted by the Parliament of a state.  
In the next article on the subject of intervening causation law in 
a medical context, Douglas Hodgson adopts a comparative law 
perspective to examine the judicial approaches and tests adopted by the 
courts of the United Kingdom, Canada, the USA and Australia to resolve 
the intervening causation issues.  The article suggests that the current 
approach of classifying the degree of negligence may be problematic 
in some circumstances and that an assessment of the degree of causal 
potency of the negligent medical treatment vis-ã-vis the harm sustained 
may be more appropriate.  
In an article which raises the question as to when a judge should stop a 
criminal trial, Andrew Hemming uses two recent cases, Wood v R and 
Patel v The Queen, as the vehicle for carrying out such analysis. 
Alexis Henry-Comley’s article considers the common law principle 
of legality and the human rights protection afforded under the 
Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and the Charter of Human Rights 
and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic).  It compares the interpretive 
obligations placed on the courts by the principle of legality and the 
current Australian human rights legislation to determine whether 
there is any weight to the proposition that the principle of legality is a 
common law bill of rights in Australia. 
As appears from the title of his article ‘Litigating Human Rights in 
Western Australia: Lessons from the Past’ Peter Johnston surveys 
cases and litigation involving civil liberties and human rights issues in 
Western Australia over a period of time to reflect upon what lessons 
may be learnt from the past. 
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In a case note on the High Court’s recent decision in Google v ACCC, 
Rosanne Sands examines the liability of internet intermediaries for 
misleading and deceptive conduct under s 52 of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth). 
It is with great pleasure and pride that I commend this issue of the 
UNDALR to our readership.
PROFESSOR DOUGLAS HODGSON  
Editor, The University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review
Dean, School of Law (Fremantle) 
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WHEN SHOULD A JUDGE STOP A TRIAL?
andrew hemmIng*
Abstract
This article is focused on what should happen in a criminal 
trial when the trial judge has serious reservations about the 
strength of the prosecution’s case as the evidence unfolds, 
or mid-trial the prosecution changes its case against the 
accused. Two recent cases are used as the vehicle for the 
analysis.  In Wood v R, the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal demolished the prosecution case and attacked the 
Crown prosecutor for failing to put the case fairly to the 
jury by resorting to fiction, impermissible reasoning and 
innuendo.  In Patel v The Queen, the High Court found that a 
miscarriage of justice had occurred because on the 43rd day 
of a 58 day trial, the prosecution had radically changed its 
case in a way that rendered irrelevant much of the evidence 
that had been admitted.  Such appellate court criticism 
invites the question: when should a trial judge stop a trial?
I   IntroductIon
The process leading to a criminal trial in higher courts is a familiar one. 
Essentially, if at the committal hearing a magistrate determines there 
is a prima facie1 case to be answered, then the accused will be put on 
trial.2  Under the standard trial process, the Crown will present the 
evidence against the accused seeking to prove all the elements of the 
offence as well as negativing beyond reasonable doubt any defences 
raised where there is an evidential onus only on the defence.3  The 
* Lecturer in Law, University of Southern Queensland.
1 The test is whether a reasonable jury properly directed could convict: Doney v The 
Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207.  See for example s 66 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
1986 (NSW): ‘If the Magistrate is not of the opinion that there is a reasonable prospect 
that a reasonable jury, properly instructed, would convict the accused person of an 
indictable offence, the Magistrate must immediately order the accused person to be 
discharged in relation to the offence’.
2 Western Australia has abolished the committal hearing and replaced it with a statutory 
regime of disclosure: see Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA).
3 A legal onus on the defence (on the balance of probabilities) applies to pleas of 
insanity, diminished responsibility, and, in Queensland only, to provocation (see 
s 304(7) Criminal Code 1899 (Qld)).  There are also some statutory reverse onus 
provisions such as s 29 of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW) relating 
to a ‘deemed supply’ charge.
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arbiter of fact4 will then convict or acquit.  Occasionally, the Crown 
may present a nolle prosequi5 when the prosecution elects not to 
proceed with its case.  The trial judge may refuse to accept a nolle 
prosequi if doing so would be unfair to the accused on the grounds 
of continued uncertainty as to whether there might be a further trial.6
However, it is an uncommon situation, given the prima facie case 
requirement at committal, for a trial judge to be faced with circumstances 
as the evidence unfolds which raise serious doubts as to whether the 
Crown case is sufficiently strong to continue with the trial. Such a 
circumstance may also involve the question of whether the prosecutor 
is fulfilling his or her responsibility to the court to put the case against 
the accused fairly.7
This article explores the dilemma faced by a trial judge, doubtless 
conscious of the cost and dislocation of stopping a trial, when the trial 
judge entertains grave reservations as to the strength and/or direction of 
the Crown case.  Matters may come to a head if the defence, following 
receipt of revised particulars, seeks to have the jury discharged.  This 
raises the question of the powers available to a trial judge to either 
invite or direct a jury to acquit the accused. Two recent cases are used 
as the vehicle for the analysis.  In Wood v R,8 the New South Wales 
Court of Criminal Appeal demolished the prosecution case and attacked 
the Crown prosecutor for failing to put the case fairly to the jury by 
resorting to fiction, impermissible reasoning and innuendo.  In Patel 
v The Queen,9 the High Court found that a miscarriage of justice had 
occurred because on the 43rd day of a 58 day trial, the prosecution had 
radically changed its case in a way that rendered irrelevant much of the 
evidence that had been admitted.
4 The arbiter of fact may be a jury or a judge sitting alone.  For example, under s 614 of 
the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) and ss 117-120 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 
(WA), either the Crown or the defence may apply for a trial by judge alone.
5 Nolle prosequi means ‘unwilling to proceed’: see, for example, s 563 of the Criminal 
Code 1899 (Qld).
6 See R v Saunders [1983] 2 Qd R 270; R v Jell; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [1991] 
1 Qd R 48; DPP (SA) v B (1998) 194 CLR 566, 600 (Kirby J).
7 For example, Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 590AB(1) states that: ‘This chapter division 
acknowledges that it is a fundamental obligation of the prosecution to ensure 
criminal proceedings are conducted fairly with the single aim of determining and 
establishing truth’.
8 [2012] NSWCCA 21 (24 February 2012).
9 (2012) 290 ALR 189; [2012] HCA 29.
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II   grounds for stoppIng a trIaL
The leading case as to the circumstances under which a trial judge may 
direct a jury to return a verdict of not guilty is Doney v The Queen.10  In 
Doney, the High Court stated:
It follows that, if there is evidence (even if tenuous or inherently weak or vague) 
which can be taken into account by the jury in its deliberations and that evidence 
is capable of supporting a verdict of guilty, the matter must be left to the jury for 
its decision.  Or, to put the matter in more usual terms, a verdict of not guilty may 
be directed only if there is a defect in the evidence such that, taken at its highest, 
it will not sustain a verdict of guilty.11
As to the evidence being ‘taken at its highest’, King CJ explained the 
appropriate test in The Queen v Bilick and Starke: 
The question of law is whether on the evidence as it stands the defendant could 
lawfully be convicted.  He could lawfully be convicted on that evidence only if 
it is capable of producing in the minds of a reasonable jury satisfaction beyond 
reasonable doubt.12
King CJ had five years previously in R v Prasad,13 addressed the question 
of whether a trial judge possessed the discretion to direct an acquittal 
if he or she considered the evidence so unsatisfactory that it would be 
unsafe for a jury to convict upon it:
It is within the discretion of the judge to inform the jury of this right [to bring 
in a verdict of not guilty], and if he decides to do so he usually tells them at the 
close of the case for the prosecution that they may do so then or at any later stage 
of the proceedings.14  He may undoubtedly, if he sees fit, advise them to stop the 
case and bring in a verdict of not guilty.  But a verdict by direction is quite another 
matter.  Where there is evidence which, if accepted, is capable in law of proving 
the charge, a direction to bring in a verdict of not guilty would be, in my view, a 
usurpation of the rights and the function of the jury.15
Thus, the weight of authority in Australia supports the proposition that 
a judge who entertains strong doubts as to the strength of the Crown’s 
case is permitted to advise the jury to return a verdict of not guilty, but 
may not direct them to do so unless the evidence taken at its highest 
could not sustain a guilty verdict beyond reasonable doubt.
10 (1990) 171 CLR 207.
11 Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207, 214-5 (Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron 
and McHugh JJ).
12 (1984) 36 SASR 321, 335 (emphasis in original).
13 (1979) 23 SASR 161.
14 Citing Archbold, Criminal Pleading and Practice (39th ed, 1976) 332.
15 R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161, 163.
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In this context, it is significant that the law in Australia differs with the 
English position, as Mohr J, the dissenting judge in R v Prasad, observed: 
‘In England, there is clear authority not only for the existence of the 
discretion but further  that the trial Judge is, in certain circumstances 
under a duty to direct an acquittal’.16  Mohr J cited Roskill LJ in R v Joan 
Falconer-Atlee in support.17  Roskill LJ had pointed out that s 2 of the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (UK) changed the basis for allowing an appeal 
in a criminal case: ‘The Court was no longer to be concerned with the 
problem whether there was evidence on which a reasonable jury could 
convict but with whether the verdict was unsafe or unsatisfactory’.18 
Section 2 above was amended by the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 (UK) 
to allow an appeal against conviction solely on the grounds that ‘the 
conviction is unsafe’.
As will be discussed in Part V of this article, which deals with the need 
for reform of the law in this area, it may be time for Australia to follow 
the English approach, and statutorily overrule Doney v The Queen.19
III   wood V r 
a   Background to the Appeal 
Mr Gordon Wood was convicted in December 2008 of the murder of 
Ms Caroline Byrne whose body was found on the rocks at the Gap at 
Watsons Bay in Sydney on the morning of 8 June 1995.20  The Gap is a 
notorious place for suicides and the Coroner returned an open finding 
in February 1998.  For some years, the police were unable to establish 
the manner in which Ms Byrne left the cliff top and her body came to 
be lodged on the rocks below.  The issue was complicated due to the 
absence of any photographs at the scene and no contemporaneous 
record was made of the exact spot where the body was found.  This left 
only the memory of the police officer, Sgt Powderly, who located the 
body and who subsequently changed his mind in 2004 as to the location 
of the body. 
The case against Mr Wood only gained traction with the involvement of 
Associate Professor Cross (‘A/Prof Cross’).  A/Prof Cross developed the 
theory that Ms Byrne could have been ‘spear thrown’ by a strong man 
using the assumed four metre run up from the ‘northern ledge’, a point 
16 Ibid 175.
17 (1973) 58 Cr App R 348, 357.
18  R v Joan Falconer-Atlee (1973) 58 Cr App R 348, 357.
19 (1990) 171 CLR 207.
20 For some of the salient facts see Wood v R [2012] NSWCCA 21 (24 February 2012) 
[1]-[21] (McClellan CJ at CL).   
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near the bend in the safety fence, from which Sgt Powderly believed Ms 
Byrne left the cliff top.  Essentially, the Crown’s case was that Ms Byrne 
could not have committed suicide because, even with a running jump, 
she could not have reached ‘hole A’ which was the revised location 
where Sgt Powderly believed he had found the body.  However, the 
Crown alleged that Mr Wood, who was in a relationship with Ms Byrne, 
could have ‘spear thrown’ Ms Byrne to ‘hole A’ using the four metre run 
up without himself falling over the cliff face, notwithstanding the agreed 
time of death was 11.30 pm on a cold, pitch black night.
The case against Mr Wood was circumstantial.  The Crown sought to adduce 
supporting evidence to A/Prof Cross’s theory as to how the body came to 
be at ‘hole A’. One strand of evidence went to motive.  The hypothesis was 
that Mr Wood killed Ms Byrne in order to protect his employer, Mr Rivkin, 
who was at the time the subject of speculation concerning share dealings 
in Offset Alpine Printing.  The Crown hypothesis was that Mr Wood 
believed Ms Byrne knew the details about the share dealings and if she 
disclosed them would cause Mr Wood to lose his job.  Another strand of 
evidence was that given by a local resident, Mr Doherty, which the Crown 
suggested indicated that Mr Wood, in company with another man, was at 
the Gap with Ms Byrne during the evening when she died, contrary to Mr 
Wood’s account of his movements.
B   The Grounds of Appeal
There were nine grounds of appeal, all of which are listed below21 
because the fact that the appellant succeeded on no less than five of 
these grounds, with criticism on an additional two other grounds, marks 
the depth of concern expressed by the appellate court at the manner in 
which the trial was conducted:
Ground 1:   The verdict is unreasonable and cannot be supported by the 
evidence. 
Ground 2:   A miscarriage of justice was occasioned by the directions given by 
the learned trial judge in relation to: 
  a.     The positive identification evidence of Martin and Melbourne 
relied on as day time sightings of the applicant and Ms Byrne at 
Watsons Bay; and/or 
  b.     The evidence of Mr Doherty and Miss Kingston relied on by the 
prosecution as night time sightings of the applicant and Miss 
Byrne. 
Ground 3:   The evidence and the opinions of A/Prof Cross caused the trial to 
miscarry. 
21 Wood v R [2012] NSWCCA 21 (24 February 2012) [48] (McClellan CJ at CL).
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Ground 4:   His Honour erred in rejecting evidence showing rocks at the base 
of the Gap being covered in water, and movement of water over the 
rocks, as being irrelevant to the trial. 
Ground 5:   His Honour erred in law in declining to identify for the jury and 
direct as to the intermediate facts requiring proof beyond reasonable 
doubt in accordance with Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 
573.
Ground 6:   The trial miscarried by reason of the prejudice occasioned by the 
Crown Prosecutor. 
Ground 7:   The trial judge erred both in leaving murder on the basis of joint 
criminal enterprise to the jury and in failing to identify properly the 
basis upon which any such verdict should be reached. 
Ground 8:   The learned trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to present 
evidence and make submissions suggesting that the deceased’s 
knowledge of details relating to the Offset Alpine fire was a motive 
for the offence of murder. 
Ground 9:   There has been a miscarriage of justice in the trial of the applicant on 
account of fresh evidence and evidence undisclosed at the trial.
The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal (‘NSWCCA’) was 
unanimous in upholding the appeal. The leading judgment was given 
by McClellan CJ at CL, with whom Latham and Rothman JJ agreed.  One 
striking feature of the appeal judgment was the number of grounds of 
appeal that were upheld.  The NSWCCA upheld Grounds 1, 6, 7, 8, and 9.22
Furthermore, even on some of the remaining four grounds of appeal, 
there was strong criticism falling short of justifying a new trial, 
particularly on the identification evidence.  For example, on Ground 
2(a), McClellan CJ at CL stated that ‘the evidence of both Martin and 
Melbourne suffered from every problem which has previously been 
considered in relation to identification evidence’.23  His Honour went on 
to reach ‘[t]he irresistible conclusion … that the evidence of Martin and 
Melbourne was so compromised and their recollection so unsure that 
little or no weight could be given to it’.24  Again, on Ground 2(b), whilst 
acknowledging the trial judge’s direction complied with the Domican 
warning on the dangers of relying primarily upon identification 
evidence,25 McClellan CJ at CL was not satisfied Doherty saw either Mr 
Wood or Ms Byrne on the evening in question as his evidence may have 
been contaminated by viewing the ‘Witness’ program.26
22 See, ibid [388] relating to Ground 1; [659] relating to Ground 6; [672] relating to 
Ground 7; [705] relating to Ground 8; [809] relating to Ground 9.
23 Ibid [409].
24 Ibid [434].
25 Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555, 561-562.
26 Wood v R [2012] NSWCCA 21 (24 February 2012) [460] (McClellan CJ at CL).
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As to Ground 4, the trial judge had accepted a Crown objection to the 
defence tendering evidence of a photograph which showed water 
covering all the rocks at the base of the cliff on the grounds it was 
irrelevant to the conditions when Ms Byrne died.27  McClellan CJ at 
CL was troubled by the evidence of Dr Duflou, a defence witness, as to 
the potential for the ocean to move Ms Byrne’s body.  ‘The opportunity 
to explore the water conditions at the time Ms Byrne was presumed 
to have left the cliff top was excluded by the trial judge’s ruling’.28 
However, his Honour let the matter rest because the defence had not 
explored this option at trial which required ‘an investigation of the tide 
and wave movement and an analysis of the injuries to her body’.29
For present purposes, the focus will be upon Ground 1: The verdict is 
unreasonable and cannot be supported by the evidence.  The reasons for 
concentrating on Ground 1 are twofold: first, McClellan CJ at CL covers 
a large amount of material which overlaps with other grounds,30 and, 
secondly, his Honour gives details of an exchange between the Crown 
prosecutor and the trial judge (in the absence of the jury) from the 
transcript of the trial where the trial judge states the position of the 
Crown ‘is utterly without logic’.31
From the outset of his Honour’s judgment, McClellan CJ at CL evinces 
grave misgivings as to the strength of the Crown case.  In discussing 
the need for a circumstantial case to be considered holistically,32 his 
Honour did not accept the Crown argument that the applicant (Wood) 
was ignoring the cumulative force of the evidence as the applicant 
had pointed to a number of factors consistent with his innocence.  His 
Honour stated:
Among these were the unreliability of the identification evidence; the deceased’s 
depression and previously attempted suicide; the ambivalence of the expert 
evidence with respect to whether Ms Byrne could have jumped from the cliff 
top or been thrown from there to where she landed; the illogicality of the 
prosecution’s argument that the applicant had ‘esoteric knowledge’ of the 
circumstances surrounding Ms Byrne’s death; and, finally, evidence which gave 
rise to the reasonable possibility that, if Ms Byrne was thrown to her death, the 
applicant was not the person responsible (either alone or jointly) for the act 
causing her death.33
27 Ibid [541]–[543].
28 Ibid [552].
29 Ibid [554].
30 Ibid [49]–[388].
31 Ibid [289].
32 Ibid [53] citing R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618 648-9 [48]-[49] (Gummow, Hayne and 
Crennan JJ).
33 Wood v R [2012] NSWCCA 21 (24 February 2012) [55] (McClellan CJ at CL).
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The critical passage from this part of the judgment is as follows: ‘this is 
a case where doubts about each piece of circumstantial evidence are 
reinforced, rather than resolved, by the rest of the prosecution’s case’.34 
His Honour continued in the same vein a few paragraphs later in stating, 
‘the Crown has not excluded as a reasonable possibility open on all the 
evidence that Ms Byrne did not commit suicide’,35 which the Crown 
accepted was an essential element of the Crown case.
In a later section of his judgment, under a heading entitled ‘The physics 
of the issue’, McClellan CJ at CL deals with expert and scientific evidence. 
His Honour considered that ‘all of this experimental analysis must be 
approached with considerable reservation’.36  His Honour contrasted the 
test conditions being in daylight and without any fear for personal safety, 
with the circumstances of Ms Byrne’s death on a pitch black, cold night 
with moist surface areas and a sheer drop of 30 metres at the northern 
ledge.37  The Crown’s version of events became virtually impossible if 
Ms Byrne was conscious and therefore struggling, as Professor Elliot, a 
Crown witness, seriously doubted whether any great velocity could be 
achieved at all, ‘certainly not with the velocity required to get from the 
ledge to hole A’.38  McClellan CJ at CL then delivered the coup de grâce 
on this point with the following telling observation:
Because of the problem of Ms Byrne struggling if she was conscious, the 
prosecutor changed tack during the trial and suggested that she may have been 
unconscious or incapacitated. However, no effective experiments were done to 
ascertain whether an unconscious Ms Byrne could have been thrown the required 
distance.39
McClellan CJ at CL then moved to consider the Crown’s ‘bottom line’ or 
‘killer point, an irrefutable point’.40  This point was the evidence which 
suggested that Mr Wood was able to identify Ms Byrne’s body on the 
rock ledge in the dark early on the morning of 8 June, some two hours 
after she died.  The Crown submission was that the only way Mr Wood 
could have known the location of the body and that her feet were up 
was if he had been there at the time when she went over the cliff.41  The 
defence line was that the Crown argument led nowhere: either Mr Wood 
could see on both occasions or he could not see on either occasion.  In 
his summing up, the trial judge, Barr J, made the following comment:
34 Ibid [56].
35 Ibid [63].
36 Ibid [275].
37 Ibid [275]-[276].
38 Ibid [276].
39 Ibid [277].
40 Ibid [287].
41 Ibid [283].
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If he couldn’t see from the top - if he couldn’t see from where he was saying - 
well, from where he was speaking next to Peter Byrne and next to the police, 
he could not have seen from where he threw the deceased off The Gap, if that is 
what he did.  And the answer may simply be that he could see; he was describing 
what he could see, or what he thought he could see.42 
The Crown prosecutor was unhappy with Barr J’s observation above, 
and, in the absence of the jury, the following exchange took place:
CROWN PROSECUTOR: Thank you, your Honour.  Your Honour, on what has been 
identified as the Crown’s ‘bottom line’ point, your Honour said, ‘The answer might 
simply be that he could see’.  Your Honour, that is not only contrary to the position 
that the Crown has taken, but it is contrary to every version that the accused- 
HIS HONOUR: Mr Crown, your position is utterly without logic. 
CROWN PROSECUTOR: Your Honour, the logic- 
HIS HONOUR: There must be an explanation. 
CROWN PROSECUTOR: The explanation is this, your Honour: that if the accused 
threw the deceased head first from the top of The Gap- 
HIS HONOUR: He aimed for hole A, did he, or for hole B? 
CROWN PROSECUTOR: He may well have assumed she landed head first. 
HIS HONOUR: Oh, come on, Mr Crown, I am not putting that. Is there anything 
else? 
CROWN PROSECUTOR: Yes, your Honour. Your Honour said that there were lights 
waving around. 
HIS HONOUR: Yes. 
CROWN PROSECUTOR: That was certainly the case when the police were there, 
particularly once the helicopter and the police rescue were there. But it was not 
the case, of course, when he was there with Peter Byrne. 
HIS HONOUR: So he couldn’t see? 
CROWN PROSECUTOR: Yes. 
HIS HONOUR: And couldn’t have known. 
CROWN PROSECUTOR: That’s his account as well, your Honour, on every version 
he gives. 
HIS HONOUR: That’s the problem with this, Mr Crown. With respect, it is an 
utterly illogical submission you have made and it deserves to be destroyed. 
CROWN PROSECUTOR: Your Honour, with respect, we don’t accept that. 
HIS HONOUR: You don’t have to, but you have got it.43
42 Ibid [288] citing paragraph [939] of the original trial.
43 Ibid [289] citing paragraph [950] of the original trial.
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Notwithstanding Barr J’s expressed determination to ‘destroy’ the Crown’s 
‘killer point’, Mr Wood was convicted of Ms Byrne’s murder and served 
three years in prison before his appeal was successful. So what is to be 
made of the above exchange?  On one view, Barr J was effectively saying 
‘you have no case, Mr Crown’, in which case his Honour could have 
summed up inviting the jury to acquit as the evidence was insufficient to 
put a charge of murder to the jury.  On another view, Barr J was inviting 
defence counsel, Mr Terracini SC, to apply for a ‘Prasad direction’ (whereby 
a trial judge can invite the jury to enter a verdict of acquittal at any time 
following the close of the prosecution case where the Crown case is found 
to be lacking in weight and reliability such that it would be unsafe for a jury 
to convict upon it).
On a further view, given Barr J had concluded that he had ‘destroyed’ the 
Crown’s ‘killer point’, his Honour believed his meaning would be plain to 
the jury, and that combined with all the other contentious evidence the 
jury would be bound to acquit the defendant.  In this, of course, his Honour 
was in error, which in turn leads to the next pertinent question of how, 
on a very weak circumstantial case which arguably should never have 
passed the prima facie case to answer test at the committal stage, did the 
jury convict Mr Wood?  The irresistible conclusion is that the jury convicted 
predominantly because the Crown prosecutor, Mr Mark Tedeschi QC, failed 
in one of his basic obligations, namely, to put the case against Mr Wood 
fairly to the jury.  The corollary is that Barr J was ineffective in reining in 
Mr Tedeschi QC.  Arguably, Barr J contributed to the very outcome which 
his Honour was apparently seeking to avoid, given the exchange (in the 
absence of the jury) above.  A further corollary is that the accused’s defence 
team consistently failed to object to the Crown’s approach and line of 
questioning, thereby unnecessarily placing the onus on the trial judge. 
McClellan CJ at CL makes numerous critical references to the approach 
taken by Mr Tedeschi QC, during the trial, and crucially upheld appeal 
Ground 6: The trial miscarried by reason of the prejudice occasioned 
by the Crown Prosecutor.  What follows is a veritable litany of examples 
designed to demonstrate that the Crown prosecutor breached his duties 
on numerous occasions.  The purpose of pointing to such an extensive use 
of impermissible reasoning and speculation is to underline the fact that the 
trial judge was given ample opportunity to intervene given the weakness of 
the Crown’s case and the manner in which the trial was being conducted 
by the Crown, especially when it came to the fifty questions the Crown 
prosecutor sought to put to the jury.
The first example occurred where the Crown was seeking to establish 
that the relationship between Ms Byrne and Mr Wood was deteriorating, 
and that Mr Wood had become very aggressive and abusive towards Ms 
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Byrne.  In support of this submission, the Crown prosecutor referred to the 
evidence of Ms McVeigh about an alleged incident in a gym on the Friday 
night before Ms Byrne died.  Ms McVeigh was asked to recall the events 
in 2006, eleven years after Ms Byrne died. Her evidence about the date 
was denied by two people alleged to have been present, and there was no 
doubt Ms Byrne was unwell on that Friday making her presence at the gym 
unlikely.  McClellan CJ at CL severely criticises the use made by the Crown 
prosecutor of Ms McVeigh’s contested evidence:
Having raised this incident with the jury, the prosecutor then used it in an entirely 
impermissible manner.  He told the jury that the Crown submission was that: 
‘This argument must have been something very serious, and it must have had 
something to do with the accused’s employment with Rene Rivkin.  That’s 
why Gary Redding was standing next to him.  I mean, would you have a rip 
roaring row with your spouse or partner with one of your fellow employees 
from your work standing next to you? Of course you wouldn’t.  Neither 
would the accused if it was something purely personal. It must have had 
something to do with Rene Rivkin for Gary Redding to be there’.
This submission was entirely speculative.  If an argument did occur it could have 
been as a consequence of trouble in the relationship, which had nothing to do with 
the applicant’s employment with Rivkin.  Redding was a friend of the applicant’s. The 
fact that he was present (if he was) may have had nothing to do with Rivkin.  It is plain 
that the prosecutor introduced the prospect that the event was related to Rivkin in 
order to support his theory as to the applicant’s motive.  It was a speculative smear.44
There can be no mistaking the strength of his Honour’s censorship of the 
Crown prosecutor with the use of words such as ‘impermissible manner’ 
and ‘speculative smear’, with similar words being used in other passages 
in his Honour’s judgment.45  Indeed, McClellan CJ at CL goes even further 
a few paragraphs later in his judgment when dealing with the Crown 
suggestion that Ms Byrne was aware of the details of Mr Rivkin’s share 
dealings in Offset Alpine Printing:
The suggestion that Rivkin was upset and that his concern was sufficient to motivate 
the applicant to kill Ms Byrne was entirely without foundation.  The submission 
should not have been made.  The exploitation of public rumour and the use of mere 
innuendo to compensate for inadequate evidence of motive is not consistent with 
the obligations of a prosecutor to press the Crown case ‘to its legitimate strength’ by 
reliance upon credible evidence.46
44 Ibid [294]-[295] (emphasis added).
45 For example, ibid [615]: ‘The prosecutor unfairly invited the jury to be suspicious of 
the applicant’s dealings with Rivkin in a manner which was clearly intended to smear 
his character’. Again ibid [616]: ‘The prosecutor also asked whether the evidence of 
the descriptions by Martin and Melbourne of the people whom they saw was “an 
amazing coincidence”. This question reversed the onus of proof and was no doubt 
designed to bolster the evidence of these witnesses. It invited the jury to engage in 
impermissible reasoning with respect to identification evidence’.
46 Ibid [305] (emphasis added) citing Boucher v The Queen (1954) 110 CCC 263 (9 
December 1954) 275 (Rand J).
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The castigation of the Crown prosecutor continues almost at every 
turn of the page of his Honour’s judgment.  Thus, when considering 
the evidence of A/Prof Cross and having noted that this evidence was 
challenged by Professor Pandy, an expert witness for the defence, 
McClellan CJ at CL launched the following judicial exocet missile at the 
Crown Prosecutor:
The submission that followed was extraordinary and should never have been 
made.  The prosecutor submitted that Ms Byrne was thrown by the sort of throw 
that shot putters do: 
‘where they hold the ball right close to their shoulders and then go round 
and round and finally throw the ball from the shoulders using not just 
their arm’s strength but their body strength, all their body strength - their 
upper shoulders, their body, their lower body, even their legs and feet - to 
propel that shot put out as far as they can. So that is the sort of action that 
we are talking rather than a spear.  But let’s call it a spear throw for the 
purposes of argument’. 
This submission was entirely unsupported by any evidence.  The evidence of A/
Prof Cross described the throw as a spear throw with the applicant (or another 
person) lifting Ms Byrne above his or her head and throwing Ms Byrne like a spear. 
The video of the tests which A/Prof Cross conducted did not include an action of 
throwing anything like that which the prosecutor described.  The tests which A/
Prof Cross conducted had the thrower holding the woman above his head with 
his arms apart so as to throw the body using the force of both hands, one near 
the head and the other near the groin.  The suggestion of a shot put action was 
an invention of the prosecutor during the course of submissions for which there 
was absolutely no support in the evidence.47
McClellan CJ at CL does not let up in his attack on the Crown prosecutor. 
Mr Doherty’s evidence that he may have seen Mr Wood and Ms Byrne 
together on the night she died was crucial to the Crown case.  The 
difficulty for the Crown was that Mr Doherty had described the woman 
he saw as affected by drugs or alcohol or both, whereas the autopsy 
confirmed neither were present in Ms Byrne’s blood:
Ultimately, all that Doherty is able to say in relation to the applicant was that after 
observing him on the ‘Witness’ program he thought that he was similar to the 
person he saw in the street who emerged from under an awning. He does not 
identify the applicant as that person.
The prosecutor sought to explain away Doherty’s description of the woman he 
observed as being affected by drugs or alcohol by saying: 
‘Of course, he would, because he had seen numerous people in that area 
who were drunk or affected by drugs having arguments like that.  That of 
course is likely’. 
The prosecutor continued: 
47 Ibid [319]–[320] (emphasis added).
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‘That doesn’t mean that that woman was actually drugged or drunk.  We 
submit to you that Caroline Byrne at that stage had been subjected to the 
most concerted attempt by the accused to convince her to stay in her 
relationship; they were arguing and arguing and arguing and continued 
to argue until the time of her death.  You might think that she had been 
so harangued in such a vociferous way by the accused that she was just 
totally and utterly distressed, not wanting to go, not wanting to be there, 
wanting to be out of the relationship, not knowing how to cleanly end it, 
as she told Angelo Georgiou, and that is why she was slurring her words 
and sobbing’. 
 
This submission is almost entirely without foundation.  It is a fiction which the 
prosecutor was not entitled to advance to the jury.  The evidence of Doherty 
was clear that the person he saw was drunk or affected by drugs.  There was 
no evidence that there had been continuous argument during the day or that 
the source of that argument was that Ms Byrne had on that day said she was to 
terminate the relationship and the applicant was attempting to convince her to 
stay.48
After further references to the Crown prosecutor’s submissions on other 
aspects of the case as ‘mere speculation’, ‘nothing more than speculation’ 
and ‘nothing more than conjecture’,49 his Honour sums up on the 
impermissible use of speculation and conjecture to draw an inference: 
‘The drawing of an inference is not a matter of conjecture.  An inference 
must be logically based, that is, it must bear some logical relationship to 
the evidence from which it proceeds’.50
As previously mentioned,51 McClellan CJ at CL upheld the appeal on 
Ground 1, and ordered that a verdict of acquittal be entered.  His Honour 
went on to deal with the other grounds of appeal.52  For the present 
purpose of developing his Honour’s attack on the Crown Prosecutor, 
attention will be confined to Ground 6: The trial miscarried by reason 
of the prejudice occasioned by the Crown Prosecutor.  In particular, his 
Honour’s damning conclusion on the fifty questions that Mr Tedeschi 
QC, put to the jury in the course of his summing up of the case against 
Mr Wood will be highlighted.
In this regard, it should be stressed that the part of McClellan CJ at 
CL’s judgment which deals with prosecutorial fair play provides a 
counterweight to the observation of Hunter and Cronin below:
48 Ibid [332]–[335] (emphasis added).
49 Ibid [367], [371].
50 Ibid [372] citing Holloway v Mc Feeters (1956) 94 CLR 470; Peacock v The King 
(1911) 13 CLR 619, 661.
51 See above n 22.
52 Wood v R [2012] NSWCCA 21 (24 February 2012) [388] citing Cornwell v The Queen 
(2007) 231 CLR 260, 300 [105].
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Australian appeal courts subscribe to the rhetoric of prosecutorial fair play 
but to date [1995], they have also endorsed the adversarial ‘play hard’ tactics 
of prosecutors and have undercut the preconditions for full disclosure.  Such 
admonitions are as much an encouragement to do battle as a warning against 
unfair play.53 
At the outset of the part of the judgment dealing with Ground 6, his 
Honour traversed the authorities covering the duties of a Crown 
prosecutor.54  His Honour commenced with Hayne J’s reference in 
Libke v the Queen55 as to whether submissions made by the Crown 
Prosecutor were ‘comments that suggested (whether directly or indirectly 
by appealing to prejudice or passion) that the jury should follow some 
impermissible path of reasoning’,56 and then continued with a discussion 
of s 13 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1986 (NSW) which 
empowers the Director to furnish guidelines for prosecutions, particularly 
the content of those guidelines.  For example, guideline 2 sets out that 
a prosecutor is a ‘minister of justice’, whose role is to assist the court to 
arrive at the truth and that ‘the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not 
to obtain a conviction’.57  Further authority to similar effect is then cited, 
such as the Crown prosecutor acting with ‘fairness and detachment’,58 
and the impermissibility of a Crown prosecutor embarking ‘upon a course 
of conduct calculated to persuade the jury to a point of view by the 
introduction of factors of prejudice or emotion’.59
McClellan CJ at CL, having established the relevant principles for 
assessing the appropriate standards for a Crown prosecutor, then 
applied these principles to the fifty questions Mr Tedeschi QC, put to the 
jury at the end of his oral address to the jury.  His Honour, building on his 
comments under Ground 1, immediately signalled that Ground 6 would 
be upheld because the Crown prosecutor reversed the onus of proof:
The difficulties which the prosecutor’s conduct created are so significant that I 
am satisfied it caused the trial to miscarry occasioning a miscarriage of justice. 
53 J Hunter and K Cronin, Evidence, Advocacy and Ethical Practice: A Criminal Trial 
Commentary (Butterworths, 1995) 207.
54 Wood v R [2012] NSWCCA 21 (24 February 2012) [572]–[581].
55 (2007) 230 CLR 559, 589 [83].
56 Wood v R [2012] NSWCCA 21 (24 February 2012) [575] citing Libke v The Queen 
(2007) 230 CLR 559, 589 [83] (Hayne J) (which referred to R v DDR (1999) 99 A Crim 
R 327, 340-343).
57 Wood v R [2012] NSWCCA 21 (24 February 2012) [577] citing Boucher v The Queen 
(1954) 110 CCC 263, 270 (Rand J).
58 Wood v R [2012] NSWCCA 21 (24 February 2012) [577] citing Whitehorn v The 
Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657, 663 (Deane J).
59 Wood v R [2012] NSWCCA 21 (24 February 2012) [578] citing Livermore v The 
Queen (2006) 67 NSWLR 659, 665 [24] (which approved the dicta in McCullough v 
The Queen [1982] Tas R 43, 57). 
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The fundamental problem with the course taken by the prosecutor was that 
both generally and with respect to particular questions the prosecutor reversed 
the onus of proof.  Asking questions, even in a rhetorical manner, and inviting 
the jury when considering its verdict to consider whether the applicant had 
provided satisfactory answers to the questions was an impermissible course for 
the prosecutor to follow.60 
Given the title of this article and the question it seeks to address, the 
following passage is highly significant, which raises the role played by both 
the trial judge, Barr J, and the defence counsel, Mr Winston Terracini SC:
The trial judge gave the appropriate directions to the jury in relation to the applicant 
remaining silent in his case. However, his Honour did not refer at all to the 50 
questions.  The jury were not told to ignore any of them. 
As I have previously indicated, senior counsel for the applicant objected to the 50 
questions being placed before the jury in a document: see Libke at [133] (Heydon 
J).  However, the prosecutor proceeded to put them to the jury orally in a careful and 
deliberate manner.  He also invited the jury to take notes and indicated that he would 
pause to allow them to take notes. 
In his closing address, counsel for the applicant attempted to deal with the questions. 
However, by so doing he gave prominence to them and left the jury to ponder 
whether the Crown’s challenge had been met. He was wrong to take this course.  He 
should have again sought to have the questions excluded and once the prosecutor 
had spoken to them he should have applied for the jury to be discharged.61 
The clear implication of the above passage is that (a) the defence 
counsel should have objected to the fifty questions being put orally 
by the Crown prosecutor; (b) once the Crown prosecutor had spoken 
to the jury about the fifty questions, the defence counsel should have 
applied for the jury to be discharged; and (c) the trial judge should have 
granted the application and discharged the jury, or, at the very least, 
instructed the jury to ignore the fifty questions.
The sheer number of questions and their rhetorical nature (for example, 
question1: How did the accused know exactly where Caroline’s body 
was located before it was found by the police?) should have alerted 
the trial judge to all the authorities cited above by McClellan CJ at CL. 
Possibly, the trial judge was guided by the lack of objection by defence 
counsel to the fifty questions being put to the jury orally.  However, it 
would seem perverse for the trial judge to instruct the jury to ignore the 
fifty questions having allowed them to be put in the first place.  The key 
decision for the trial judge was whether to allow the fifty questions or 
their continuance once the tenor of the questions had been established.
60 Wood v R [2012] NSWCCA 21 (24 February 2012) [604]–[605] citing at [606] R v 
Rugari [2001] NSWCCA 64 [35]–[36].
61 Wood v R [2012] NSWCCA 21 (24 February 2012) [619]–[621].
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Arguably, the trial judge should not have been surprised as to the 
speculative and prejudicial nature of the fifty questions given the manner 
in which the Crown prosecutor had led the evidence, as detailed above 
by McClellan CJ at CL when dealing with Ground 1.  This came to a 
head with the exchange detailed above between the Crown prosecutor 
and the trial judge over the logic of the Crown’s case on the ‘bottom 
line’ point.  Certainly, after this exchange, the trial judge should have 
reconsidered his decision not to instruct the jury as to how they should 
treat the fifty questions.
In this context, it is illuminating to examine the Queensland Benchbook 
and some extracts from the entry entitled ‘General Summing Up 
Directions’:
What is not evidence
A few things you have heard are not evidence.  This summing-up is not evidence. 
And statements, arguments, questions and comments by the lawyers are not 
evidence either.
Primary facts and inferences
You may only draw reasonable inferences; and your inferences must be based 
on facts you find proved by the evidence.  There must be a logical and rational 
connection between the facts you find and your deductions or conclusions.   You 
are not to indulge in intuition or in guessing.
In a circumstantial case, consider adding, for example: Importantly, if there is an 
inference reasonably open which is adverse to the defendant (ie one pointing to 
his guilt) and an inference in his favour (ie one consistent with innocence), you 
may only draw an inference of guilt if it so overcomes any other possible inference 
as to leave no reasonable doubt in your minds.62
Thus, at a minimum, Barr J could have pointed out that the Crown 
prosecutor’s fifty questions were not evidence.  Furthermore, given 
the exchange on the ‘bottom line’ point, the evidence that Ms Byrne 
was very depressed at the time of her death, and the disputed expert 
evidence on the ‘spear throw’, it would have been open to Barr J in such 
a circumstantial case to invite the jury to return a verdict of ‘not guilty’ 
as the Crown had not excluded the possibility of suicide.
Whilst it should be acknowledged that ‘[t]he feel and atmosphere of 
one trial may make it reasonable and even necessary for tactics to be 
employed that would seem out of place and disproportionate to the 
circumstances of another’,63 it is apparent that the Crown prosecutor, 
62 Department of Justice and Attorney-General, Supreme and District Court Benchbook 
(Queensland: The Department 2008) s 24.3– 24.4.  For the equivalent summing up 
directions in New South Wales, see Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book (Judicial 
Commission of New South Wales, 2002) [7-000]–[7.040].   
63 R v McCullough (1982) 6 A Crim R 274, 285.
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Mr Tedeschi QC, was fighting for a conviction in breach of the DPP’s 
own guidelines.  In fairness to Barr J, all trial judges are in the hands of 
the counsel that appear before them as regards the evidence presented. 
However, a trial judge is in control of his or her court, and the law has 
jealously guarded the right of an accused to a fair trial.64 
In light of the number of grounds of appeal upheld (five in total), as well 
as the strength of the criticism of the Crown prosecutor, are the courts 
in need of legislation as to the criteria for deciding when the Crown 
is not fulfilling its duties to the court?  Or is the outcome in this case 
an aberration, able to be promptly corrected by the DPP enforcing its 
own guidelines?  Or is it rather a case of trial judges having to be more 
assertive, mindful of the likelihood of a successful appeal if they are too 
passive?  The answers to these questions may become clearer following 
an examination of another successful appeal based on the conduct of 
the Crown case. 
IV   pateL V the Queen 
a   Background to the Appeal
In June 2010, Mr Patel was convicted by a jury of three counts of 
manslaughter (of Mr Morris, Mr Phillips and Mr Kemps) and one count 
of unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm (to Mr Vowles).65  At the 
relevant time, Mr Patel was employed as a surgeon at the Bundaberg Base 
Hospital, and subsequently his competence as a surgeon had been the 
subject of considerable media attention.  The general tenor of the Crown 
case was that ‘the appellant [Mr Patel] was generally incompetent and 
grossly negligent in: recommending the surgical procedures; the manner 
in which he carried out each of them; and the post-operative treatment 
which he supervised.’66  Particulars of the prosecution case were only 
provided on the 6th day into the trial and only for Mr Morris.  On this 
basis, the defence applied on the 10th day to have the jury discharged 
without giving a verdict under s 60 of the Jury Act 1995 (Qld).  The trial 
judge, Byrne SJA, refused the application but, as will be discussed later,67 
not without expressing reservations as to the breadth of the Crown case.
On the 43rd day of the trial, the prosecution provided revised particulars 
which narrowed the case against Mr Patel because the focus was now 
 
64 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292.
65 See Patel v The Queen (2012) 290 ALR 189, 189-190 for summary of some salient 
facts.
66 Ibid 191 [2] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
67 See below n 83.
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on whether the surgical procedure in each of the four cases should 
have been undertaken.  The following day, the defence failed in a second 
attempt to have the jury discharged on the grounds that a considerable 
body of prejudicial and now irrelevant (as against the revised particulars) 
evidence had previously been admitted over the preceding six weeks 
of what ended up as a 58-day trial.  The Queensland Court of Appeal 
dismissed Mr Patel’s appeal holding that with one exception all the 
previous evidence admitted before day 43 remained relevant.68
B   The Grounds of Appeal to the High Court
The grounds of appeal to the High Court were twofold.  The first ground, 
that s 288 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) did not encompass the 
decision to operate, was dismissed and is not pertinent for present 
purposes.  The second ground, that there was a miscarriage of justice 
in the conduct of the trial due to the trial judge’s refusal to discharge 
the jury on day 44 because evidence ‘that was highly prejudicial and 
now largely irrelevant had been admitted and it was not possible to 
ameliorate its effects on the jury by directions’,69 was upheld and a new 
trial ordered.  The focus here will be upon the decisions the trial judge, 
Byrne SJA, made and the options open to his Honour.
The essential feature of the trial that is required to be kept in mind 
is the absence and then the change in the particulars of the charges 
against Mr Patel.  In his judgment, Heydon J emphasised the fundamental 
requirement for the accused to be provided with particulars of the 
charges against him or her,70 citing both Dixon J and Evatt J in Johnson 
v Miller.71  Heydon J drew attention to the absence of particulars prior 
to the trial and the lack of orders pursuant to s 573 of the Criminal 
Code 1899 (Qld):
573 Particulars
The court may, in any case, if it thinks fit, direct particulars to be delivered to the 
accused person of any matter alleged in the indictment, and may adjourn the trial 
for the purpose of such delivery.72
As pointed out by Heydon J at a hearing on 20 March 2010, two days 
before the trial commenced, the trial judge had ‘expressed surprise at 
68 R v Patel; ex parte A-G (Qld) [2011] QCA 81 (21 April 2011) (McMurdo P, Muir and 
Fraser JJA).
69 Patel v The Queen (2012) 290 ALR 189, 192 [6].  The High Court’s decision was 
unanimous (5-0).  French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ gave a joint judgment, while 
Heydon J gave a separate judgment.
70 Patel v The Queen (2012) 290 ALR 189, 226-7 [167]–[169].
71 (1937) 59 CLR 467, 489 (Dixon J), 497-8 (Evatt J).
72 Patel v The Queen (2012) 290 ALR 189, 227 [170].
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the lack of particulars’,73 and at the end of the first day of the trial, after 
releasing the jury, hoped that ‘at some stage … not too far away – the 
particulars … will need to be reduced into writing’.74  The following 
revealing exchange, had also taken place thereafter between the Crown 
prosecutor and the trial judge:
The trial judge pointed out the need for the prosecution to isolate instances where 
it claimed that the appellant had exhibited a lack of care which allegedly caused 
death.  Prosecution counsel then said: ‘the Crown is not inclined to leave itself 
in the position where the defence can say, “Well, you pick one and we’ll pick the 
other”, and that’s why – and it’s really a consequence of the generally substandard 
treatment of this patient’.  The trial judge then replied: ‘It can’t be left to the jury 
on the basis that there’s a litany of things that went wrong and then leave it to the 
jury to pick and choose which of them might matter to a case of unlawful killing’. 
Prosecution counsel answered: ‘Well, that’s a consequence not of the Crown’s 
choosing, but of what he did’.  The trial judge responded: ‘We shall see’.75
The question that has to be asked at this juncture is: why did the trial 
judge not adjourn the trial until the particulars had been supplied in 
all four cases?  His Honour could rely both on s 573 above and binding 
High Court authority in Johnson v Miller.76  Furthermore, Byrne SJA had 
already foreseen the ‘troubles which would later plague the trial’.77  The 
question of why there was no adjournment is thrown into starker relief 
when before the start of the 6th day of the trial, particulars in relation to 
Mr Morris were finally provided to the defence.  Byrne SJA was critical 
of the particulars: 
The trial judge said that judging by the particulars, the trial ‘is about to become 
considerably more difficult’.  His Honour said that if the particulars for the other 
patients were going to be like those for Mr Morris, the trial would become 
‘unmanageable’.78
There is a further reason why Byrne SJA, having perceptively identified 
the potential for the trial to become ‘unmanageable’, should have 
intervened under s 573.  As Heydon J pointed out there were inherent 
problems with the trial that related to (a) the complexity of the technical 
and scientific evidence; (b) the charges concerned four different patients 
which raised cross-admissible similar fact evidence; (c) the charges were 
serious; and (d) the adverse publicity.79  Heydon J drew the inference 
on the latter point that in light of the pre-trial publicity ‘there was great 
 
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid 227 [172] (Heydon J).
75 Ibid.
76 (1937) 59 CLR 467, 489 (Dixon J), 497 - 498 (Evatt J).
77 Patel v The Queen (2012) 290 ALR 189, 228 [173] (Heydon J).
78 Ibid 229 [176].
79 Ibid 224-6 [162]–[166].
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pressure on the prosecution to put the case against the appellant on the 
widest possible basis’.80
At the start of the 9th day Byrne SJA had correctly foreseen that the 
case against Mr Patel would be pared down to the decisions to operate, 
whilst also acknowledging defence counsel’s complaint on the mud 
being thrown in the course of the evidence:
I grant you that it is hard for you in a case where, as you put it a little figuratively, 
every piece of mud that can be thrown is.  And you may be right. My optimism 
that it will be pared back by the time it goes to the jury to a digestible case 
capable of rational assessment may prove to be unduly optimistic.  You might still 
be confronted [with] a welter of additional or alternative allegations.81
Nevertheless, when at the start of the 10th day of the trial, defence 
counsel applied for a discharge of the jury, Byrne SJA refused the 
application, as Heydon J pointed out:
The application metamorphosed into an application for an adjournment.  The 
purpose of that adjournment would have been to ‘put in place a tightly controlled 
court managed schedule’ in relation to final particulars.  In argument, the trial 
judge opposed the complaint about particulars.  His opposition flowed from the 
lateness with which the matter had been agitated.82
Thus, the stage was set for what eventually transpired: namely, that 
the prosecution would change tack when it realised it would have 
to concentrate on Mr Patel’s decisions to operate rather than on his 
performance of the operations and his post-operative care.  As previously 
mentioned,83 the Crown on the 43rd day of the trial provided revised 
particulars which narrowed the case against Mr Patel.  But, by then, the 
die had already been cast.  The time to adjourn and save the case was 
on the first application on the 10th day, not on the second application 
to discharge the jury on the 44th day of the trial, by which time all the 
prejudicial and now irrelevant evidence had already been admitted. 
The unfortunate irony is that the second application was bound to fail 
as the trial judge had effectively closed off that option on the 10th day, 
while the appeal was bound to succeed as the prejudice to Mr Patel was 
overwhelming. 
The most perplexing aspect of the trial is, arguably, the strange 
combination of perspicacity and inactivity on the part of the trial judge. 
In the course of an outstanding judgment, Heydon J, an expert in the law 
 
80 Ibid 226 [166].
81 Ibid 229 [178].
82 Ibid 230 [180].
83 See Part IV A.
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of evidence, draws out Byrne SJA’s repeated misgivings at the manner in 
which the Crown was developing its case in the following passage of his 
judgment: 
On the twentieth day, Thursday 22 April 2010, the trial judge declared that he 
was ‘completely befuddled’ by the prosecution case.  On the twenty-first day, 
the trial judge challenged the prosecution to produce authorities that supported 
the proposition that ‘you can bolster a case to characterise an act or omission 
as gross by reference to some other act or omission not shown to have any ... 
causal connection with the death’.  His Honour foreshadowed the possibility that 
‘we may ... be confronting, 10 weeks down the track, an application to discharge 
without verdict because the jury will have heard so much that can’t ultimately be 
left to them ... I remain very troubled by the idea that you can prove a case against 
this surgeon by finding every little criticism that can be mustered and saying, 
‘Things could have been done differently’.84
Yet, despite these very significant and ongoing misgivings, Byrne SJA was 
content to adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach.  Thus, after the particulars 
for Mr Vowles were finally handed up on the 38th day, the trial judge said: 
‘I’m, frankly, struggling to see how we will move past the particulars to a 
digestible case.  Anyhow, we shall see how these things develop’.85
It was therefore with a degree of inevitability that the trial finally reached 
its crucial point on the 43rd day, when the Crown narrowed its case and 
the following day the defence made its second application to discharge 
the jury.  After all that had gone before, Byrne SJA’s reasons for refusing 
the application are curious as Heydon J points out:
The primary ground of the application was that much of the evidence admitted at 
the trial was not admissible on the case the revised particulars propounded.  The 
trial judge accepted a submission by the prosecution that evidence of bad surgery 
performed by the appellant was relevant to whether he knew he was a bad 
surgeon.  This, in turn, went to proving that he was morally culpable in advising 
that he should perform surgery.  The trial judge accepted defence counsel’s 
argument that the evidence could be unfairly prejudicial.  But his Honour pointed 
out that the defence had not objected to most of it.86
Plainly, the trial judge was relying on his directions to the jury 
overcoming all the prejudicial evidence previously admitted against 
broader particulars, and in defending his decision to continue the 
trial on the basis that defence counsel had previously failed to object. 
Heydon J convincingly rejects such reasoning:
The trial judge had repeatedly said that the original particulars were incoherent, 
had permitted the deployment of every possible complaint about the appellant 
and had led to mud slinging.  But he declined either to discharge the jury or to 
 
84 Patel v The Queen (2012) 290 ALR 189, 230 [181].
85 Ibid 231 [185].
86 Ibid 232 [190].
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grant an adjournment for the particulars to be regularised. … Once the discharge 
application on the forty-fourth day failed, there was no point in defence counsel 
trying to have the objectionable evidence rejected at that late hour.  It had had its 
impact – the 39 days of mud throwing to which the trial judge had often referred. 
That impact was inexpungible.  Defence counsel’s failures to object therefore lack 
determinative significance.87
c   Two Pertinent Questions
The purpose of marshalling the above extracts from Heydon J’s judgment 
is not to review the unanimous decision of the High Court to uphold the 
appeal, but to focus on the decisions and options open to the trial judge 
in light of the purpose of this study.  In this context, Heydon J posed two 
pertinent questions at the conclusion of his judgment:
One is: to what extent can and should judges in a criminal trial by jury intervene 
of their own motion to reject evidence to which a party fails to object?  The other 
question is: when should judges in a criminal trial by jury compel the prosecution 
to provide particulars even though the defence has not pressed for them?88
In setting out his first question, Heydon J referred to four authorities, 
which will now be considered in turn.89  
In Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness, Spigelman CJ referred to the Evidence 
Act 1995 (NSW) and the general proposition that ‘not admissible’ which 
has been interpreted as meaning ‘not admissible over objection’ might 
have to be revisited in special circumstances:
In the ordinary course, the words ‘not admissible’ in the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) 
means ‘not admissible over objection’ … If this appeal were being conducted 
under the new s 32 of the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 (NSW) and the court 
were concerned to identify ‘a question as to the admission of evidence’, it may 
have been necessary to consider whether the special circumstances of this trial 
were such as indicate that the delays involved in objecting to evidence were 
so inappropriate as to require a qualification of the general proposition I have 
advanced.90
In Dhanhoa v The Queen,91 Gleeson CJ and Hayne J discussed the extent 
to which s 116 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) contained a ‘mandatory’ 
requirement that a judge was always required to inform the jury of a 
special need for caution before accepting identification evidence, even 
where the reliability of the evidence was not disputed.  Gleeson CJ and 
87 Ibid 246 [243].
88 Ibid 251 [262].
89 The four authorities are Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262, 287 
[149]; Dhanhoa v The Queen (2003) 217 CLR 1, 8–9 [18]–[22]; R v Kaddour (2005) 
156 A Crim R 11 [62]; and Gonzales v The Queen (2007) 178 A Crim R 232, 243-4 
[24]–[26].
90 (2000) 49 NSWLR 262, 287 [149].
91 (2003) 217 CLR 1.
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Hayne J noted that there may be a number of reasons why counsel for an 
accused might not object, but ‘it is only in the most technical sense that 
there is any question of “accepting” the evidence’.92  Consequently, s 116 
is to be read in the adversarial context in which the section operates, and 
therefore ‘the provision means that the information referred to is to be 
given where the reliability of the identification evidence is disputed’.93
In R v Kaddour,94 Hulme, Barr and Buddin JJ expressed a similar view 
to Spigelman CJ in Seltsam that the words ‘is not admissible’ should be 
construed as meaning ‘is not admissible over objection’, in stating that 
the appellant, Kaddour, was confronted by a fundamental difficulty from 
the failure to object to the reception of the evidence at trial.95  This line 
of authority was also followed by Giles JA in Gonzales v The Queen 
in stating ‘the ground of appeal fails in limine because, in the absence 
of objection, the statement was not inadmissible and was not wrongly 
admitted’.96 
On the first question above, the weight of authority supports the general 
proposition that it is better for the trial judge not to intervene as this 
would interfere with the well accepted practice of allowing counsel to 
conduct the trial as they consider appropriate.  Only Spigelman CJ in 
Seltsam appears to entertain a qualification to the general rule under 
special circumstances.  Heydon J underlines the point that ‘a complaint 
on appeal that evidence not objected to at trial is inadmissible is 
ordinarily one that is very hard to make good’,97 but his Honour goes on 
to state that the circumstances of Mr Patel’s trial were not ordinary.
A trial judge is used to having to make decisions, particularly in the voir 
dire, as to whether or not to exercise judicial discretion in admitting 
evidence over objection.  An experienced trial judge would also 
be aware that a failure to object may be a tactical one such as out of 
fear of antagonising the jury or prompting the jury into thinking the 
defence has something to hide.  The trial judge has an overarching duty 
to conduct a fair trial, and it is surely not a step too far for a judge to 
intervene to reject evidence without the precondition of an objection 
where the interests of justice require it.  For example, the fifty questions 
the Crown prosecutor put to the jury in Wood, or allowing all the ‘mud 
slinging’ in Patel before the particulars had been narrowed down.
92 Ibid 8 – 9 [21].
93 Ibid 9 [22].
94 (2005) 156 A Crim R 11. 
95 Ibid 26 [62].
96 (2007) 178 A Crim R 232, 243-4 [24]–[26]. 
97 Patel v The Queen (2012) 290 ALR 189, 245 [241].
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There is authority on s 137 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), which 
deals with the exclusion of prejudicial evidence in criminal proceedings, 
that ‘[t]he fact that no application was made on behalf of the appellant 
under s 137 did not remove that obligation [the balancing act between 
probative value and unfair prejudice] on the part of the Court’.98  As 
Beazley JA stated in Steve v R, s 137 ‘is mandatory in its terms and is 
not dependent upon objection being taken to the admission of the 
evidence’.99  His Honour cited Heydon JA in R v Le100 as authority:
[T]he terms of [s 137] are mandatory.  They must be complied with whether or 
not a party who might gain from their invocation actually invokes them.  It is 
notable that Part 3.11 (in which s 137 appears) … [is] not listed as among the 
provisions which the court may, with the parties’ consent, dispense with: s 190 
[waiver of rules of evidence].101
This leads into the second question: when in a criminal trial should a 
judge compel the Crown to provide particulars in the absence of the 
defence pressing for them?  Consistent with the authority of Johnson 
v Miller,102 the answer is from the start of the trial.  How else can the 
criteria below expressed by Dixon J and Evatt J be met? 
For a defendant is entitled to be apprised not only of the legal nature of the 
offence with which he is charged but also of the particular act, matter or thing 
alleged as the foundation of the charge.103
It is an essential part of the concept of justice in criminal cases that not a single 
piece of evidence should be admitted against a defendant unless he has a right to 
resist its reception upon the ground of irrelevance, whereupon the court has both 
the right and the duty to rule upon such an objection.  These fundamental rights 
cannot be exercised if, through a failure or refusal to specify or particularize the 
offence charged, neither the court nor the defendant (nor perhaps the prosecutor) 
is as yet aware of the offence intended to be charged.  Indeed the matter arises at 
an even earlier stage.  The defendant cannot plead unless he knows what is the 
precise charge being preferred against him.104
Section 573 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) gives statutory expression 
to the above criteria, but leaves the direction on particulars to the 
discretion of the court.  It is here contended that it would be desirable to 
amend s 573 to make the direction on particulars mandatory.  However, 
wider reform is necessary.
98 Chand v R [2011] NSWCCA 53 [82] (Hoeben J), citing in support  R v Chai [2002] 
NSWCCA 512 [43].
99 [2008] NSWCCA 231 [60].
100 (2002) 130 A Crim R 44, 47.
101 Ibid 65 [47].
102 (1937) 59 CLR 467, 489 (Dixon J), 497-498 (Evatt J).
103 Ibid 489 (Dixon J).
104 Ibid 497- 498 (Evatt J).
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V   reform
Reform needs to be considered at two levels: first, at the pre-trial 
disclosure stage, and secondly during the course of a trial.  The Criminal 
Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) provides a comprehensive model regime for 
disclosure.  For example, Division 2 of Part 3.2 is entitled ‘Pre-hearing 
disclosure of prosecution case’, and s 41 covers the content of the full 
brief.  Section 41 is extensive and refers to other relevant sections of 
the Act, such as s 47 ‘Rules with respect to statements’, and s 416 which 
deals with ‘Disclosure of material by the prosecution’.
Division 2 of Part 5.5 is entitled ‘Pre-trial disclosure’, and s 182 Criminal 
Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) requires a summary of the prosecution 
opening and notice of pre-trial admissions.  Section 182(2) is illuminating, 
especially in the context of the Patel case:
(2)  The summary of the prosecution opening must outline –
 (a)    the manner in which the prosecution will put the case against the 
accused; and
 (b)    the acts, facts, matters and circumstances being relied on to support a 
finding of guilt.
Given the manner in which the Patel trial developed, it is also instructive 
to consider the import of s 184 Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic):
Intention to depart at trial from document filed and served
If a party intends to depart substantially at trial from a matter set out in a document 
served and filed by that party under this Division, the party -
 (a)  must so inform the court and the other party in advance of the trial; and
 (b)  if the court so orders, must inform the court and the other party of the 
details of the proposed departure.
In addition, under s 199 Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic), the Court is 
given wide powers to make orders and other decisions before trial:
Court may make orders and other decisions before trial
(1)  At any time before trial, the court may hear and decide any issue with respect 
to the trial that the court considers appropriate, including-
 (a)  an issue of law or procedure that arises or is anticipated to arise in the 
trial, including an issue as to admissibility of evidence;
 (b)  an issue of fact, or mixed law and fact, that may be determined lawfully 
by a judge alone without a jury, including an issue as to admissibility of 
evidence;
 (c)  an application for an order that may be made in relation to the trial 
under this or any other Act or at common law, including an application 
to quash a charge in the indictment;
 (d)  any other issue with respect to the trial.
Arguably, the issues that beset the Patel trial would have been minimised 
WHEN SHOULD A JUDGE STOP A TRIAL?
81
if the relevant procedures outlined above in the Criminal Procedure Act 
2009 (Vic) had been the law in Queensland.  However, there is also a need 
to consider reform of the law during the course of the trial along similar 
lines to the English Criminal Appeal Act 1995 discussed earlier in Part II. 
This would involve a statutory overruling of Doney v The Queen.105
Essentially, the position in England is that where technically there is 
evidence on which the accused could lawfully be convicted but the 
trial judge concludes it would be unsafe to convict on the evidence, the 
judge may withdraw the case from the jury.106  By contrast, in Australia 
in such circumstances the judge could only advise the jury to return a 
verdict of not guilty if the evidence taken at its highest could not sustain 
a verdict of guilty.  It would appear that Australian legal authorities are 
more concerned with the purported usurpation of the function of the 
jury than their legal brethren in England. 
However, not all Australian judges have endorsed the lack of judicial 
discretion to direct the jury to reach a verdict of not guilty.  As was 
mentioned in Part II above, Mohr J dissented in R v Prasad,107 citing 
McGarvie J in the Victorian case of Wilson v Kuhl.108  Mohr J observed 
that the law in South Australia had not been altered as in England, but 
that in any event s 353(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 
1935 (SA) provides inter alia that an appeal should be allowed if the 
Full Court thinks ‘that on any ground there has been a miscarriage of 
justice’.109
Mohr J concluded:
The existence of such a discretionary power would seem to accord with good 
sense and the proper administration of justice.  The cases will be few in number 
where a trial judge would be minded to exercise his discretion so as to withdraw 
a case from the jury and as was pointed out in Mansfield’s case it should never 
be so exercised when the ultimate decision will rest on the view to be taken of a 
witness’s credibility.  To do so would be to usurp the function of the jury.110
It would appear that the substitution of ‘unsafe’ for ‘miscarriage of 
justice’ will not secure the reform being sought.  It would appear to be 
necessary to insert a new section in the relevant Criminal Procedure 
legislation to the same effect as the test used in R v Mansfield,111 
105 (1990) 171 CLR 207.
106 R v Mansfield [1977] 1 WLR 1102.
107 (1979) 23 SASR 161.
108 [1979] VR 315, 319.
109 R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161, 176.  Section 353(1) is unchanged as regards to 
allowing an appeal ‘on any ground there was a miscarriage of justice’.
110 Ibid (citations omitted).
111 [1977] 1 WLR 1102.
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namely: where technically there is evidence on which the accused could 
lawfully be convicted but the trial judge concludes it would be unsafe to 
convict on the evidence, the judge may withdraw the case from the jury. 
This would effectively overrule Doney v The Queen.112
VI   concLusIon
This article has posed the question when should a trial judge stop a 
trial?  In the two main cases used for the purpose of examining this 
question, Wood v R113 and Patel v The Queen,114 the Crown prosecutor, 
in both New South Wales and Queensland respectively, proceeded 
against each of the accused in a manner inconsistent with the duties 
of a Crown prosecutor to conduct a fair trial on behalf of the State. 
The contention is made that it is insufficient to leave the matter to 
the guidelines for prosecutors issued by the respective Office of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions.115  Courts need to be more rigorous in 
enforcing the fundamental precepts expected of the Crown, as outlined 
by the authorities.116  In Wood v R,117 the portion of McClellan CJ at 
CL’s judgment which deals with prosecutorial fair play provides clear 
guidance to trial judges.
The focus of suggested reform has been on a comprehensive regime 
for disclosure of the Crown case.  The Criminal Procedure Act 2009 
(Vic) has been singled out as providing a comprehensive model regime 
for such disclosure. In addition, it has been argued that Australia should 
follow England’s lead by enacting legislation enshrining a judicial 
discretion to direct a verdict of not guilty where technically there is 
evidence on which the accused could lawfully be convicted but the trial 
judge concludes it would be unsafe to convict on that evidence.
112 (1990) 171 CLR 207.
113 [2012] NSWCCA 21 (24 February 2012).
114 (2012) 290 ALR 189.
115 The enforcement of prosecutorial responsibilities is an ongoing issue which is outside 
the scope of this article. In the Wood case, Mr Mark Tedeschi QC, was the Crown 
prosecutor. Mr Tedeschi has a controversial history as a Crown prosecutor.  See for 
example Gleeson CJ’s judgment in R v Anderson (Hilton Bombing Case) (1991) 53 
A Crim R 421.  Presumably, Barr J would have been aware of Mr Tedeschi’s history.
116 See, for example, the cases cited above at n 55 to n 59: Libke v The Queen (2007) 230 
CLR 559, 589 [83] (Hayne J); Boucher v The Queen (1954) 110 CCC 263, 270 (Rand 
J); Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657, 663 (Deane J); Livermore v The 
Queen (2006) 67 NSWLR 659, 665 [24].
117 [2012] NSWCCA 21 (24 February 2012) [576]–[581].
